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Abstract  
 
Different types of organizations, e.g. National Institute of Health (NIH), Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), Canadian Association of Gastroenterology (CAG), American Psychological 
Association (APA), aspire consensus in different ways, through different research processes.  
 
First, we introduce a rudimentary continuum to deal with these consensus seeking organizations, 
arguing that the continuum ranges from consensus conferences to systematic review. The ground for 
comparison is the benefits these organizations share, be it each in a particular manner. As 
understood today, one deciding factor for their place on the continuum is the extent to which they 
appeal to, what we will call, deliberative interaction, consisting of inter- and intralevel deliberation, 
and deliberation after direct confrontation.  
 
Second, we use these insights to shape further philosophical discussion on the aim of aspiring 
consensus versus the need for uptake of dissent. This quarrel can be understood as follows: On the 
one hand, when push comes to shove, establishing a scientific consensus is imperative to solve 
controversies, such as global warming. Establishing a consensus on the causes and extent of global 
warming could facilitate policymaking and, moreover, send a convincing signal that doing nothing will 
have dire consequences. On the other hand, studies carrying attention for plurality and heterodoxy 
have raised questions concerning the ideal of the scientific consensus, and, connected to it, the 
neglect of dissent (Longino, 2002; Solomon, 2006; Van Bouwel 2009). In solving this tension between 
plurality and consensus, which is not always made explicit in knowledge-based accounts of consensus 
(Gilbert, 1987; Miller, 2012), there is, as we claim, a meta-consensus or a meta-agreement in play. 
Therefore, instead of focusing on consensus on the simple level (that is, as the result of alternative 
theories/models tested against one another eventually thought to be leading to some consensus 
outcome) we can shift to analyzing the meta-consensus that stipulates the procedure to be followed. 
A meta-consensus on the procedure can guarantee, on the one hand, that divergent opinions 
are heard (without having to endorse a group consensus). In this account, consensus (in the 
absolute sense of the term) is no longer regarded as an end in itself. On the other hand, this 
approach allows us to maximize consensus (understood here in a relative sense) by going 
through the established procedure and afterwards portraying the present consensus through 
known democratic methods (such as majority rule, voting, aggregation and negotiation). The 
underlying account of consensus will thus be a social one (not stipulating the characteristics the 
outcome should have, but stipulating the social procedure that has to be followed). As a result, 
understandings of consensus-making differ in how much weight they place on procedures relative to 
substantive considerations about the quality or characteristics of the outcomes of these processes.  
 The two parts taken together thus imply that consensus comes in degrees, depending on the extent 
to which the procedure has been followed, repeated, etc. Moreover, it serves as a framework to 
reinvestigate current claims on consensus making in consensus conferences as not bringing about 
rational consensus (Solomon, 2007 & 2011).  
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